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as a sex offender) which occurred wholly in another

State responds by arguing that he had to register either in the other state or in
Idaho, and therefore, the State could still prosecute him. However, the Idaho Supreme
Court has already essentially rejected that argument. The reasons the Supreme Court
rejected that argument are consistent with the plain language of Idaho's statutes and
the fundamental principles of jurisdiction and venue. Therefore, this Court should also
reject the State's argument.

Since the Indictment was jurisdictionally-defective for

falling to allege a criminal act occurring in Idaho, this Court should reverse the district
court's order denying Mr. Villafuerte's motion to dismiss the indictment
case for

remand this

of an order of dismissal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Villafuerte's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

2

State's argument on appeal boils down to a single point - that "changes in
information that an offender is obligated to update under I.C. § 18-8309(1) must be
to the countv sheriff or to an official in another state, if that state requires
J

registration." (Resp. Br., p.6.) Therefore, the State contends, Idaho can prosecute the
to register even if the registrant has moved out of the State of Idaho.

(Resp.

, pp.6-7.) That argument runs contrary to basic principles of law embodied in Idaho's
statutes and the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court on this topic. Therefore, this
Court should reject the State's argument.
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has already essentially rejected the State's
argument. See State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561-62 (2012). In that

the Supreme

Court vacated a conviction for failure to register, explaining:
The State contends that the evidence in the record
beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lee violated I.C. § 18-8309 because it proves that
he moved from his last known address without providing notice of a new
address or actual residence. This argument fails because (1) I.C. § 188309 does not apply to changes of address or actual residence to other
countries and (2) the State never proved that Lee moved to a new address
or actual residence in Idaho.
Lee, 153 Idaho at 561 (emphasis added).

In a footnote, the State attempts to

distinguish Lee, but it only discusses the first reason
conviction.

(See Resp. Br., p.11 n.4.)

vacated that

It argues that, since the Supreme Court's

decision was based on the lack of the word "country" in the relevant version of the
statute, "the Court implicitly found that the evidence would have been sufficient if the
state had shown that Lee established residence

3

another

leaving the

1 n

"

is

"

(emphasis
reveals that

. Thus, as

Villafuerte explained in his initial brief,

were two implicit conclusions within the Lee decision: that

the duty to report under the SORA statute when a registrant moves out of Idaho only
exits in the state to which the defendant moved, and that there was no resid

duty to

notify Idaho that he had moved out of the State of Idaho. (App. Br., pp.18-20.) Were
either of those two conclusions not part of the decision, there would be no need for the
State to prove the defendant moved to a new residence "in Idaho." See id. Therefore,
even if the prosecution had shown the defendant in Lee had moved to another state, the
conviction would still have been vacated under the second rationale. See id.
In this case, the State has effectively conceded in its Respondent's Brief that
is no evidence that Mr. Villafuerte moved to a new address or
State of Idaho:

in the

"[Mr.] Villafuerte did not report to the jail, or return to his registered

address, but instead absconded to Nevada and was later arrested in Utah." (Resp.
Br., p.1; see also R., p.55 (the district court pointing out that both parties submitted that
Mr. Villafuerte had left the State of Idaho, not moved within it).) Since the State has not
offered any proof that Mr. Villafuerte "moved to a new address or actual residence in
Idaho," his conviction, like the conviction in Lee, should be vacated.

Basically, what Lee recognizes is that there are jurisdictional limitations in Idaho's
judicial system - for the courts to have subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal case,
an essential element of the criminal act must have occurred in Idaho. See Lee, 153

4

19-

a

."

Doyle, 121

913-14.

By noting the defendant must have moved "in

Idaho," the Supreme Court essentially recognized that no essential element of failure to
register occurs

Idaho if the registrant moves out of the state. That means

State is

arguing for an expansion of prosecutorial jurisdiction to allow prosecution of acts wholly
occurring outside the State

Idaho, and so,

interpretation would

a direct

between those statutes. As a result, that argument should be rejected.
To help explain his analysis on this point, Mr. Villafuerte directed this Court to
several decisions by the United States Supreme Court which discussed statutes that,
like SORA, designate a
(See App. Br., pp.10-17.)
statutes

location for the established duty to be performed.
Supreme Court provided a detailed

within the context of jurisdiction and venue, concluding that the

authority to prosecute for failure to perform the established duty only

in the

jurisdiction where the duty was supposed to have been performed.

(See App.

Br., pp.10-17.)
In response, the State contends those cases are not relevant because
Mr. Villafuerte's claim is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and "the plain language of
[I.C. § 19-301 (2)] indicates 'venue is nonjurisdictional."'

(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)

That

argument ignores the language of subsection 1 of that same statute, which begins:
"Jurisdiction - venue." I.C. § 19-301 (1 ). Therefore, the language of the statute, read as

5

is

as

as
as a

fails to

is the dual meaning

- the term "jurisdiction" can

term "jurisdiction"

specifically to personal and subject

jurisdiction, or it can generally refer to "a court's authority to take certain action or
grant a certain type of relief." State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375 (Ct. App. 2008).
Mr. Villafuerte's challenge in this case is that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the Indictment did not allege a crime that actually occurred
in the State of Idaho. (R., pp.37-42.) Idaho Code§ 19-301 recognizes that the analysis
of whether the act occurred in Idaho incorporates aspects of venue. I.C. § 19-301(1).
that end, it provides that only

occurring in Idaho may

criminally charged in

Idaho's courts, and that the modicum of proof necessary to establish whether the act
in Idaho is a

of

§ 19-301. Ultimately,

not occur in Idaho, the act is not prosecutable

Idaho

I.C. § 19-

301 (1 ), and so, Idaho's courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Thus, while venue is not equivalent to jurisdiction (i.e., it is "nonjurisdictional"), aspects
of venue are relevant within certain jurisdictional analyses. Therefore the State's first
argument to distinguish the Supreme Court's venue discussions is meritless.
The same is true of the State's second contention - that those opinions are not
controlling, in that they do not discuss the jurisdictional limitations of Idaho's SORA
statute specifically. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) Mr. Villafuerte has not contended that those
cases are controlling in that regard, but rather, has argued that their analysis helps

6

case.

in

in

is

a

to which the registrant is moving. I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a); compare Doe v. State,
1

Idaho 778 (2015) (noting that Idaho's registration requirements would control if and
the petitioner was sufficiently employed in Idaho despite the different registration

requirements applicable to him in his home state of Washington).

Thus, like in the

Supreme Court's cases, any authority to prosecute for not fulfilling that duty lies only in
jurisdiction in which the duty is to be performed.
Besides, rare indeed would be the cases that are factually identical. As such,
Idaho's courts have often examined how other courts have handled similar issues,
particularly when they are examining an issue that has not been fully explored by
Idaho's courts or when a court in another jurisdiction has engaged in a particularly
of the issue. See, e.g., Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho
92 (2003) ("Our decision is in accord with the vast weight of persauasive authority
jurisdictions."); State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697, 703 (Ct. App. 2013) ("We find
reasoning fo the Massachusetts Court of Appeals persuasive."). The State does
not criticize the United States Surpeme Court's analysis of this issue. (See generally
Resp. Br.) Thus, this Court may properly consider that anlaysis in understanding how a
similar issue under Idaho's statutes should be resolved. Since the person who moves
out of Idaho is only obligated to act in the jurisdiction to which he is moving, prosecution
for failing to perform that duty is improper in Idaho. Compare Lee, 153 Idaho at 561-62.
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in an

I.
. § 18-8309(2) unambiguously relieved an

once the offender moved

1

a

of the duty to register annually in

another State." State v. Wilson, 2013 WL 5488655,

(Ct App. 2013). The State contends that this Court should not look to the discussion
in Wilson because the opinion is unpublished, and so, cannot be relied on as precedent.
(Resp. Br., p.10 n.2.) Mr. Villafuerte has already explained that Wilson is not cited as
precedent. (App. Br., p.17 n.8.) Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court has approved:
"When this Court had cause to consider unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions
because an appellant had discussed the cases in his petition, we found the presentation
of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[e].'

Likewise, we find the hearing

officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an
example, was appropriate." Staff of Idaho Real

Comm'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho

630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)).

Thus,

referencing an unpublished opinion as a historical example of how a learned court has
analyzed the particular question at issue in this case is appropriate, and that is all
Mr. Villafuerte has asked this Court do with the discussion of this question in Wilson.
(App. Br., p.17.)
The State also attempts to distinguish this

of analysis by pointing out that the

defendant in Wilson was charged under a different section of the SORA statute than
Mr. Villafuerte. (Resp. Br., p.10 n.2.) The State's argument is unavailing because the
plain language of the statutes still reveals its argument to be erroneous. The conduct
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is more
or

or

a
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§ 1

11(1) .

SORA also unambiguously relieves the registrant of his duty under
statute in Idaho if he moves

of

"If the offender intends to reside in another

jurisdiction, the offender shall register in the other jurisdiction within two (2) days of
moving to that jurisdiction and will not be removed from the sexual offender registry in
Idaho until registration in another jurisdiction is complete." Idaho Code§ 18-8307(4)(a)
(emphasis added); see also I.C. § 18-8306(5)(c) (requiring the state to notify the
registrant "of the requirement to register in a new jurisdiction within two (2) days .... ").)
Thus, while Idaho's records will still reflect the defendant's status as a sex
offender until he meets his duty to register in that other state, his duty is still to register
"in the other jurisdiction." LC. § 18-8307(4)(a). Since statutes are to be construed as a
once

Villafuerte

to out of the State of Idaho, regardless of what

of information the State believes he needs to report, 1 he was relieved

that duty to

provide that information to Idaho; his duty was to provide that information to the new
jurisdiction. Compare Lee, 153 Idaho

561-62 (hoiding that, absent evidence that the

The State contends that, in addition to not updating his information as required by
I.C. § 18-8309(1 ), Mr. Villafuerte also violated LC. § 18-8309(2) (requiring the registrant
1

to notify the jurisdiction of a lodging lasting more than seven days regardless of whether
that lodging would be considered a residence). (Resp. Br., p.6 n.1.) However, the
decision in Lee demonstrates that to be an erroneous position as well, as the Idaho
Supreme Court assumed that the defendant had "travelled through one or more states
before leaving the United States, he would not necessarily have had an address in any
of those states," and yet, it still vacated his conviction. Lee, 153 Idaho at 562. Thus,
the jurisdiction the registrant would be required to notify under I.C. § 18-8309(2) would
be the one he was obligated to report to in general. In cases such as this, that is the
new jurisdiction to which the registrant moved. I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a).
9

"a

a new

was

case is
and the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Lee, this Court should reject the
attempts to justify the invasion of another state's sovereignty by allowing it
prosecute an act which occurred wholly in that other state.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Villafuerte respectfuliy requests this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to dismiss and remand this case for entry of an order of dismissal.
DATED

12th day of January, 2016.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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